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INTRODUCTION
For many years, those observing Mexico have debated the ques-
tion, "Is the Mexican Revolution dead?"' Those responding in the
affirmative have noted that the institutionalization of the Revolu-
tion along with the development of the dominant, "official" political
party, the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), has created a
new political elite, a massive and conservative bureaucracy, and a
system opposed to change. Many feel that this political system hav-
ing guaranteed political stability and social peace in Mexico for so
many years, is unable to bring meaningful change or reform. Mex-
ico's current economic crisis has led many of these pessimists, along
with members of the press and others, to speculate that only an-
other revolution can alter existing structures sufficiently to respond
to the present needs of the country. A review of the historical devel-
opment of modern Mexico will facilitate an evaluation of the pos-
sibilities of reform or revolution.
I. THE HISTORY OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT
The pax porfiriana, or the Porfirian peace, of the dictatorship of
Porfirio Diaz from 1876-1910 was a period of order, progress, in-
frastructure expansion, economic growth, and modernization. The
alliance constructed by Don Porfirio to guarantee political stability
included large landowners, foreigners, businessmen, parts of the
emerging middle class of small businessmen, merchants, profession-
als, and public and private white collar functionaries. These groups,
constituting a small minority of Mexico's population, shared in the
benefits of Mexico's economic growth, urbanization, and moderni-
zation. The majority of Mexico's people, the urban poor and the
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I. See S. Ross, Is THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION DEAD? (1966).
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rural peasants, were excluded. Their standard of living had declined
for many years. In 1910 a day's work bought fewer basic commodi-
ties such as beans, corn, tortillas, and bread than a century before.
During the Porfirian years, the majority of Indians and other rural
peasants lost their land through manipulation of the legal system
and violent acts of the rural mounted police, the infamous rurales.
Forced from their traditional lands, these peasants either became
permanent day laborers at large rural estates or joined the ranks of
the urban poor.2
Increasing dissatisfaction of political liberals, labor unrest, dis-
possessed peasants, and regional elements combined in 1910 to cre-
ate a decade of revolution that significantly changed traditional
Mexico. The Constitution of 1917 embodied a revolutionary ideol-
ogy and included the goal of destroying the hacienda system as well
as official support of labor. Anti-Spanish, anti-foreign currents also
emerged from the chaotic decade of change. By the early 1930s
revolutionary gains were consolidated, and the process of institu-
tionalizing the Revolution moved forward.
By the 1940s the emergence of a single dominant political party
and the elite's consensus on internal development strategies set
Mexico on a course that continues today. That course was one of
import substitution industrialization, minimal level social service in-
frastructure investment, rural investment concentrated on modern-
izing the agricultural sector through large irrigation projects, and
distribution of the gains of economic growth to a small minority of
Mexicans. This minority consists of the political elite, industrialists,
businessmen, large rural landowners, professionals, and government
white collar bureaucrats. The "trickle down" approach to develop-
ment has concentrated significant wealth at the top. At the bottom
there has been little improvement and often declines in real income
and standard of living. Presently, 10% of all Mexicans receive 41%
of the total income while 20% receive less than 3% of the income.
Real wages have declined by at least 20% during the 1980s.3
2. J. WOMACK, ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1969). This book provides
brilliant descriptions of the process of modernization in the Morelos region to the southwest
of Mexico City, of how the Porfirian elites dispossessed villagers, small land owners, and
Indians of their best lands, and of how this encouraged urban migration and eventually led to
revolt. P. FRIEDRICH, AGRARIAN REVOLT IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE (1970) describes this same
process in Michoacan, to the northwest of the capital.
3. L. BROWN & J. JACOBSON, OUR DEMOGRAPHICALLY DIVIDED WORLD (1986).
[Vol. 18
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A. Mexico's Erratic Progress
Mexico has made some social progress. Between 1934 and 1940,
under the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, the Mexican government
made significant expenditures on public housing, education, elec-
tricity for rural areas, potable water systems, rural road networks,
subsidies for basic consumer food products, and public health
projects." However, these expenditures have not been priorities with
all subsequent presidents. Often such expenditures have been made
only in response to a specific crisis or to periods of neglect, and
have provided Mexico with an incomplete social safety net, but
have helped maintain peace. Erratic expenditures typified Jose Lo-
pez Mateos's presidency (1958-1964), which moved the social pol-
icy of the Revolution to the left to compensate for the policies of his
immediate predecessors.'
The dominant political party, the PRI, has been able effectively
to guarantee political continuity and stability. It has implemented
the basic development strategy of modern Mexico. The PRI par-
tially created the conditions that permitted the "Mexican economic
miracle," a period of sustained high economic growth rates from
the 1940s through 1980. The PRI distributed gains of this eco-
nomic growth. The country saw an increase in the number of
wealthy individuals and families. There was also an impressive ex-
pansion in the number of people in the relatively affluent middle
class-businessmen, bureaucrats, educators, scientists, engineers,
and other professionals.
The party also developed a system for dealing with challenges to
the one-party dominance of the political arena. Most importantly,
the PRI was skilled at co-optation,6 the process of incorporating
individuals and groups who presented real or potential challenges to
the system. For example, militant labor leaders who joined the sys-
tem of the national, government-controlled labor confederation, the
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), would pass mi-
nor benefits along to their union's rank and file. They were able to
personally profit from the arrangement. Those who resisted were
often violently repressed.7
4. J. WILKIE, THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AND SOCIAL
CHANGE SINCE 1910 (1970).
5. See M. MEYER & W. SHERMAN, THE COURSE OF MEXICAN HISTORY (1970).
6. See J. HELLMAN. MEXICO IN CRISIS chap. 5 (1983) (concerning "opposition, co-
optation, and repression").
7. Id.
19871
3
Ganster: Political Change and Stability in Mexico: The Historical Context
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
B. Political Realities Sustain the System Despite Economic
Disparity
There is a huge disparity between the few who have benefited
from the Revolution and the majority of Mexicans living in pov-
erty. Additionally, that gap has tended to widen over the last four
or five decades. Observers of contemporary Mexico often wonder
how the system has been able to survive and prosper. The answer
is, in short, that enough opportunities and alternatives have existed
in contemporary Mexican society to siphon off much of the discon-
tent. Rural poverty and unrest have been muted by migration away
from the depressed countryside. Co-optation by the PRI has elimi-
nated another current of potential discontent. The United States
has also functioned as a safety valve over the last five decades.'
Finally, urban areas in Mexico have provided enhanced opportuni-
ties for the ambitious. All of this has taken place within the context
of an expanding economy. Thus, most Mexicans have seen some
hope for improved conditions, personal advancement, and advance-
ment of their families. The expectation that things would continue
to improve accompanied the decades of increased prosperity.
This system began experiencing crisis in the mid-1970s. How-
ever, crisis was not new to Mexico. The political ideology of the
continuing revolution, endorsed by the PRI, required a continuing
series of crises." The term revolution implies a crisis situation, and
the continuing crisis justifies the need for political continuity in the
form of the PRI. Therefore, crises of different types that have ap-
peared over the years have served to bring the political system more
in line with economic and social realities.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
The current crisis in Mexico, instead of justifying its continuity,
is presenting a challenge to the political system. The tremendous
prosperity from the Mexican oil boom in the early 1970s, led Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo to declare that the real challenge faced by the
country was managing their wealth. The subsequent economic col-
lapse severely shocked the system. The Mexican formula ceased to
work properly. Devaluation of the peso, sustained high inflation,
8. Many Mexican scholars are reluctant to accept this position. Instead, they empha-
size that Mexico is merely supplying a demand in the United States for low-cost labor.
9. See J. Wilkie, Crisis as a Way of Political Life: Real vs. False Issues in Mexico's
Permanent Revolution (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author at the Institute For
Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State University).
[Vol. 1 8
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foreign debts of over 100 billion dollars, and a contracting domestic
economy led many Mexicans to question the efficacy of the political
system. Although reasonable levels of the universal phenomenon of
corruption can be tolerated by all systems, many Mexicans and for-
eigners perceived that the corruption level reached unprecedented
heights under the regimes of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo. They
believe that the scale of corruption is related to the seriousness of
the present crisis.
The Mexico City earthquake in the fall of 1985 compounded the
situation. Many Mexicans criticized the government for inade-
quately responding to the challenges of rescue and recovery. The
result was that more people lost confidence in the system.
Several phenomena indicate a lack of confidence in the PRI.
Capital flight shows a lack of confidence in future profitability. One
recent estimate calculated that 55 billion dollars have been trans-
ferred to the United States and elsewhere.' 0 Human flight also
shows a lack of confidence in future conditions. Immigration to the
United States has been significant. Although this phenomenon has
long been a tradition among Mexico's rural poor, the stream of im-
migrants has now changed qualitatively. Large numbers of edu-
cated Mexican professionals and intellectuals are discouraged about
the ability of the Mexican system to provide opportunities. In the
face of declining standards of living, they are choosing to leave the
country. This middle class discontent is crucial. Although the total
number exiting might not be great, they represent the loss of an
important human resource.
The current Mexican crisis is perhaps the greatest challenge to
the political system of modern Mexico. The crash of the petroleum
market coupled with several decades of Mexican domestic and for-
eign policy has created the current crisis. Contrary to the popular
Mexican perception (that foreign bankers "forced" the country to
take the loans), the foreign debt is the result of faulty Mexican
predictions about the future of petroleum prices, unwise support of
the peso's value prior to 1982, and wasteful, non-productive invest-
ment decisions." The policy of providing secure domestic markets
for Mexican industry has also been a contributing factor. Mexican
10. The estimate on capital flight is by the U.S. Treasury Department is cited in V. DE
MARGUIA, CAPITAL FLIGHT AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: MEXICAN POST-DEVALUATION EXILES
IN A CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY 8 (1986).
II. For an excellent discussion of the debt crisis and evolution of the crisis, see N.
BAILEY & R. COHEN. THE MEXICAN TIME BOMB (1987).
1987]
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industrial production is not competitive in world markets. The
Mexican industrial sector, typified by the Grupo Alpha, 2 was a
creature of a protected environment and unable to withstand the
shocks of domestic economic downturn or international competi-
tion. In many cases, the Mexican government was the largest cus-
tomer. When the government ran out of money, the markets
collapsed.
A. Population Growth Negates Mexican Progress
Mexico's population policy has also played a role in the current
crisis. This policy is not a popular topic for discussion in Mexico or
in many circles in the United States. Mexico's population growth
rate reached an annual rate of 2% in 1940, increased to 2.62% for
1950-1955, rose to 3.3% for 1960-1965, rose again to 3.5% during
1965-1970, reached a peak of about 3.6% during the early 1970s,
began to taper off in the late 1970s, and is currently approximately
2.6% per annum. 13 Since the late 1930s, adult and infant mortality
have decreased due to political stability, social expenditures, and
investment in the public health area. The combination of Catholic
traditions and anti-population planning in Marxist and other leftist
ideologies forestalled national population planning until midway
through the presidency of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976).
Uncontrolled population growth in Mexico has negated many ec-
onomic gains. For example, despite significant investment in educa-
tion, in 1960 there were 1.5 million more illiterates in Mexico than
fifty years earlier." Although presidents Echeverria and Lopez Por-
tillo both invested heavily in the educational infrastructure, the
number of illiterates in Mexico is still about 7 million.
12. The Grupo Alpha was created in 1974 when the Grupo Monterrey was split up.
Grupo Alpha soon grew into Latin America's largest private corporation with companies and
firms in steel, food processing, automobile parts, electrical appliances, tourism, development,
and real estate. in 1982, the Grupo Alpha, unable to pay its debts, had to declare many of
its enterprises bankrupt and undertake a major program of restructuring. See A. RIDING,
DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 146, 148, 285-86 (1985).
13. See 22 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN AMERICA 77 (J. Wilkie & S. Haber eds.,
(1983)). Reliable demographic data are often difficult to obtain. On the one hand, counting a
rapidly expanding population is a difficult matter, compounded by insufficient resources com-
mitted to the task, as witnessed by the badly flawed 1980 national census. On the other
hand, population data are often manipulated by the Mexican government for political pur-
poses. Apparently, the population of northern border cities has been deliberately underre-
ported in order to minimize issues related to undocumented migration into the United States
and for purposes related to disbursement of federal funds to states. The Instituto Mexicano
de Seguro Social claims a current population growth rate of 2.0 per annum, a figure that
many observers feel is unrealistically low.
14. M. MEYER & W. SHERMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
[Vol. 18
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The per capita income of Mexicans has increased only in years of
high economic growth rates. Years of moderate, stagnant, or nega-
tive growth have brought declines in per capita income. During the
period 1980-86, Mexico experienced a 7% decrease in per capita
income. Notwithstanding a significant economic turnaround, Mex-
ico will end the decade of the 1980s with a lower per capita income
than it began with.1 5 Mexico's current population of 82 million is
projected to expand to 199 million by 2010, an increase of about
2.1 million people per year at the current annual population growth
rate of 2.6%. Approximately one million young Mexicans will enter
the job market each year for the remainder of the century.
The large population and the high demographic growth rate tax
the ability of the economy to keep pace and place significant de-
mands on the finite natural resource base of the country. Water
shortages, erosion, destruction of tropical rain forests, desert expan-
sion, and inefficient land use all contribute to problems of the agri-
cultural sector. Lack of new lands being brought into production
means that production can only be increased by changing old sys-
tems. Generally this manuever is an expensive and politically diffi-
cult proposition. Declining per capita production of agricultural
products means that Mexico is less able to feed it own population.
Mexico, the birthplace of the Green Revolution," is increasingly
relying on imports of basic foods.
B. Urban Concentration Impedes Progress
The urban environment has also experienced severe problems in
recent years. Air, water, and ground pollution have made Mexico
City and its environs increasingly less livable. The cities of Guada-
lajara and Monterrey have experienced similar problems. Mexico
City, with seventeen million inhabitants, is so large and complex
that the cost of services has surpassed the price the government can
charge for them." The quality of life in urban Mexico is deteriorat-
ing rapidly.' 8
15. L. BROWN & J. JACOBSON, supra note 3 at 28.
16. CIMMYT, a plant breeding center established by the Rockefeller Foundation, had
by the late 1950s succeeded in producing several conspicuously successful varieties of wheat
adapted to Mexican conditions. These varieties plus other factors later provided the basis for
a revolution in agricultural production (the Green Revolution) in India, Pakistan, and other
countries. See P. YATES, MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL DILEMMA 10 (1981).
17. I. SCOTT, URBAN AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 239-44 (1982).
18. The Mexican and foreign press regularly reports on Mexico City air quality levels
sufficiently poor as to cause significant human health problems.
1987]
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The components of Mexico's current crisis described above could
cause social and political instability. Whether a combination of
these elements will lead to violent or revolutionary change depends,
to a large extent, on the response of Mexico's political system.
III. THE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
Mexico's political system historically has functioned well in peri-
ods of crisis. In the past, periods of stress have effectively redirected
public policy to reduce the causes of the problems at hand. In this
sense, the Mexican political system has demonstrated considerable
flexibility in adapting to new circumstances and conditions. There
are several examples of this flexibility. First, Mexico has recognized
that the centralized nature of the government is inefficient. The
government has taken the first steps to decrease dependency on
Mexico City by other regions of the country. Although this pro-
gram's achievements are largely normative, or only in the planning
stage, the program is evidence of a new course having been charted.
Some actual progress towards decentralization has been made, par-
ticularly in the areas of health and education. 9 Second, economists
have placed partial blame for Mexico's current economic position
on the government's excessive involvement in the economy. The
government is attempting to amend this situation through restruc-
turing the economy by enhancing the roles of the domestic private
sector and foreign capital. This economic liberalization should con-
tribute to the long-term recovery of Mexico's economy and to the
process of altering traditional structure.2
The sector of the Mexican economy least fettered by government
control and regulation is the maquiladora, or in-bond industry. This
industry has been a great success story in recent years and a good
indicator of the country's potential in other areas of economic
activity.21
Decentralizing and opening up the economy will require the PRI
and the government to relinquish some political control. Decisions
19. J. Castafieda, Mexico's Coming Challenges, FOREIGN POLICY 120-39 (1986) dis-
cusses economic liberalization and also presents an excellent analysis of the current situation
in Mexico.
20. See, e.g., Reynolds & McCleerly, Border Economic and National Integration (pa-
per presented at IV Symposium of Mexico and the United States Universities, Santa Fe,
New Mexico, Apr. 16-18 1986).
21. For an up-to-date overview of the maquiladora industry, see N. CLEMENT & S.
JENNER. LOCATION DECISIONS REGARDING MAQUILADORA/IN-BOND PLANTS OPERATING IN
BAJA CALIFORNIA, MEXICO (1987), (Institute for Regional Studies for the Californias, San
Diego State Univ., San Diego, Ca.).
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made in the provinces or through market forces will reduce the
number of decisions made by the federal government and will cor-
respondingly reduce political power exercised by the PRI.
IV. LIBERALIZED ELECTION LAWS MAY SUPPORT PEACEFUL
CHANGE
Liberalizing and democratizing the electoral process are other is-
sues of political control. Criticism of the PRI's monopoly on the
government grew sharply during the administration of Lopez
Mateos (1958-1964) and resulted in a constitutional amendment of
1964. That amendment altered the electoral procedures in the
Chamber of Deputies and guaranteed minority party representation
in the lower house. Although this liberalizing tendency was trun-
cated by the Diaz Ordaz regime, it demonstrated some flexibility
on the part of the PRI. Again in 1980, laws were changed to permit
the incorporation of minority participation by opposing political
parties. This effort was led by Reyes Heroles, Lopez Portillo's Sec-
retary of Gobernacion. Of course, now the question is to see if the
PRI can meet the challenge presented mainly by the Partido Ac-
cion Nacional (PAN) and truly open up the political process. A
certain amount of democratization will be required to avoid escalat-
ing political confrontations (such as the furor over the recent Chi-
huahua elections.)
CONCLUSION
Present day Mexico lives under a pax porfiriana of sorts, al-
though all historical analogies must be used with caution. Portfirio
Diaz and his aged advisors were simply unable to adapt to chang-
ing conditions and deal with the forces unleashed in 1910. A
revolution resulted. The current Mexican leaders and the PRI are
faced with perhaps the worst crisis since 1910. Although widely
criticized as being out of touch with reality, both the PRI and the
system have a track record of accommodation and adjustment. The
PRI has generally responded well to crisis in the past, and there is
every reason to believe that they will continue to do so in the
future.
One big difference between 1910 and 1987 is the existence of a
Mexican middle class, which in recent decades has grown in size
and has received a greater share of the benefits of the Mexican
economy. Today, more Mexicans have a stake in stability and con-
tinuity and in the system. Therefore, movements that suggest radi-
1987] 139
9
Ganster: Political Change and Stability in Mexico: The Historical Context
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
140 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
cal breaks with the past should not gather much support. In 1910,
change was accomplished only. through revolution; in 1987, it ap-
pears that change will be accomplished without unduly disrupting
the basic stability of the country.
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